Reframing the debate: Ending Loyalist Paramilitarism
The Northern Ireland Development Group, October 12th, 2024
Introduction
Tomorrow is the thirtieth anniversary of the Combined Loyalist Military Command ceasefire statement (released 13 October 1994) that brought an end to loyalist violence in Northern Ireland. That moment may have heralded the new possibility of peace but loyalist paramilitary groups continue to exist in Northern Ireland today. This raises two immediate and fundamental questions: why and what needs to be done to bring such groups to a close? The ceasefire statement was remembered for the comment, ‘In all sincerity, we offer to the loved ones of all innocent victims over the past twenty years, abject and true remorse. No words of ours will compensate for the intolerable suffering they have undergone during the conflict’, but the final part of that statement is also important since it set out hopes and aspirations for a new and better society: ‘We are on the threshold of a new and exciting beginning with our battles in future being political battles, fought on the side of honesty, decency and democracy against the negativity of mistrust, misunderstanding and malevolence, so that, together, we can bring forth a wholesome society in which our children, and their children, will know the meaning of true peace.’ For the majority of loyalists, the expected new world has failed to materialise as hoped and paramilitary organisations remain.
In 2018 the loyalist groups who had committed to the 1994 ceasefire announcement (Red Hand Commando, Ulster Freedom Fighters, Ulster Defence Association and Ulster Volunteer Force) released a further collective statement underpinned by a desire for change consistent with much-needed social transformation. In that statement the groups declared a need to ‘recommit to the creation of a Northern Ireland that enables all to realise their potential and aspirations’. Believing that they could work as ‘advocates for change’ and become integral to a ‘society that is at ease with itself in its diversity and difference’ the Loyalist Transformation Statement, as it was known, was serious in tone and intent. The groups would work with ‘the co-operation of others’ to ‘ensure loyalist communities are at the centre of Northern Ireland's peace[ful] and political transformation.’ Since then little has changed. If not in equal measure, the groups have referred to concepts like ‘demobilisation’, ‘civilianisation’ and ‘transitioning’, but such terms seem problematic. Even if these concepts signify an active attempt to remove the military ethos of paramilitarism it is unclear how each will support the removal of organisational structures. Furthermore, in a context of ongoing recruitment, the language of transformation might be seen to support continuation of the paramilitary presence, rather than help end it.
One risks a certain misrepresentation when depicting all groups in the same way since differences in scale, locality, control and activity prevail. However, that said, we do not wish to differentiate between groups here on the basis of whether they are better or worse in terms of influence so, for that reason, and given the tendency for loyalist paramilitary groups to make collective statements, we will use the term paramilitarism generically and consider levels of influence, control and coercion in general terms too. It is for others to concern themselves with the details of difference and levels of control. What we do wish to acknowledge, however, is the good work being done by a range of bodies in loyalist areas on community development and the efforts being made by those bodies to build communal and individual responsibility.
While we note how loyalist paramilitarism has been used in some areas to sustain criminality and coercion within communities we also recognise that the existence of paramilitary groups also offers reassurance and perceived protection against threats both external and internal to communities. On that basis, we do not underestimate that for some the existence of groups is welcomed. Furthermore, we acknowledge the good work being done by a range of groups in loyalist areas, many with paramilitary roots, in community development, education and in building communal and individual responsibility. However, any benefit they impart is outweighed by the criminal activities and coercive practices associated with, or given cover by, paramilitary organisations. Our position is firmly rooted in the contention that the continued existence of paramilitary groups in a progressive, decent, post-conflict society cannot endure and that supportive structures of change properly funded, monitored and implemented are necessary for ending paramilitary groups. Clear distinction between ex-combatants, community workers and criminals is needed to help bolster the constructive influence of loyalists seeking to move on from the impact of conflict and distinguish between those determined to promote constructive change and those who wish to exploit fears and concerns in order to maintain reputation and self-serving advantage.
Declining confidence in political unionism does not help transition to ending loyalist paramilitarism. As political unionism weakens so feelings of loss and perceptions of defencelessness and vulnerability among loyalist communities are intensified and the presence of organisations offers reassurance because of that. Ending paramilitarism is more likely when communal confidence is durable enough to support change. This is also a matter of political responsibility since when political unionism is weakened so confidence in loyalist areas is also reduced, making positive change much harder. Without conviction that the Union has a future it is unlikely that paramilitary groups will take steps to dissolve.
With dwindling faith and confidence in political unionism amongst loyalists it is also perhaps unsurprising that anxiety, tension and anger have increased and that the forces of tribalism exert influence more forcefully because of that. We note that when anxiety and uncertainty intensify so anger grows and this works against the eradication of paramilitarism. Confidence and creativity are important factors in dismantling the structures of violence and when both are lacking so the possibility of change is lessened. We also observe that anger and anxiety can act as new forces of mobilization that further inhibit moves to end paramilitary structures.
Though we do not wish to place responsibility for the continuation of loyalist paramilitary groups on political unionism we nevertheless suggest that a more confident and progressive political unionism is an important component in helping to leverage a transition process for loyalist paramilitary organisations. Because of this we see political development as integral to ending paramilitarism, not incidental to it, and an emphasis on political coordination across party lines as important for shaping consensus and agreement on steps towards change.
We further believe that social stability rather than communal strength is a better means by which to assist the case for ending paramilitarism and that a commitment to improving the stability and security of Northern Ireland as a whole is integral to effectively countering negative representations of loyalism that feed anxiety and fear. Social circumstances are important. Greater state and private sector funding to support education outside of schools along with more deliberate efforts to develop integrated education are both important. A greater emphasis and investment in vocational courses and manual skills, begun at an earlier age, would improve young men’s educational experience and outcomes. More resources to facilitate continued study and recreational activities after school are also important and we strongly support the need for further economic investment in loyalist areas to that end. This should involve creating a wider range of initiatives and programmes for education and training for young people. As part of that process subsidised adult education programmes and helping to generate and sustain a culture of learning within loyalist areas to encourage ambition and aspiration is seen as essential for creating a better future.
Criminality and individuals within loyalist paramilitary groups using the reputation of those groups to inflict misery and exploitation in communities must be addressed and this requires better relations between the police and loyalist communities. Decisive police action to counter criminality is vital for helping overcome paramilitary repression and coercion within communities. Taking into account that policing has limited resources it is important to increase state funding significantly in order to more effectively deal with the criminality that tarnishes communities and reduces confidence as a result.
Any criminal activity undertaken by those affiliated to loyalist organisations while transition is being concluded should result in the expulsion and isolation of those involved. Swift police action must also lead to effective punishment against criminals. Currently, too many individuals are being given suspended sentences, or being released without charge and this is undermining efforts to deter criminal activity.
Taking the above points into account, we note how ending loyalist paramilitarism is a complex problem requiring a multi-stranded approach. Work at political, social, economic, communal and organisational levels that converges to produce real change in communities is important and without this work we do not believe that the closure of loyalist paramilitary organisations is likely. We also wish to assert that progressive loyalists must themselves strive to build constructive and productive relations and encourage movement away from the insular tendencies that loyalism has come to rely upon. It is important that loyalist leaders initiate dialogue and contact with others and ask for help and support on matters that are clearly articulated and offer verifiable benefits. We believe that loyalist leaders should now make it explicit what they require to make transition realisable and that they prove through actual steps and outcomes the expectations they articulated in 1994 and 2018. There can be no more prevarication. Change must be unambiguous and demonstrate intent to finally end the paramilitary structures that continue to exist some thirty years after the CLMC ceasefire statement.
Recommendations
For the purposes of this short paper we recommend some measures that are designed to create movement towards the closure of paramilitary groups but also believe that this change is reliant on social, political and economic transformation working together. Initially we would like to see a collective public commitment given by the organisations:
1. Confirming that groups no longer exist as paramilitary organisations.
2. Making it clear that all recruitment has ended
3. Establishing an end date for all internal processes of change (civilianisation, demobilisation or another etc).
4. Reaffirming a categorical rejection of all criminality and working with criminal justice agencies and the police to better hold those involved in crime to account.
5. Setting out responsibilities for supporting social transformation with a designated task force that will communicate and work with politically appointed representatives and detailing what is needed to bring that transformation about.
6. Asserting a recommitment to support positive change for Northern Ireland as a whole.
7. Nominating key individuals to update on the above and to feed into new areas of collaborative work through bodies such as a civic forum.
8. Working with police to better deal with criminality and prevent the emergence of new groups.
9. Setting up an advisory group to counter and confront negative media stereotypes of loyalism and forge new positive relations with others, particularly in the U.S.
10. Creating a new code of practice for commemoration and education of loyalist history based on citizenship and civic responsibility that underscores the wider strategies of change.
11. Funding bodies and the two governments should work closely with loyalist representatives on transition and the closure of paramilitary organisations. This should not only be left to organisations themselves to undertake. Timelines and agreed outcomes must be established and failure of organisations to meet those timelines and outcomes should result in withdrawal of funding. Just as there have to be enticements to help bring about the closure of paramilitary organisations so there must be tangible disadvantages and consequences to not committing to such a process.
Conclusion
We fully appreciate that there are a range of complex actions and steps needed to end loyalist paramilitarism but we also stress that a functioning democracy cannot justify the continuing existence of such groups. There is a clear need to improve relations between political unionism and loyalism but this responsibility should also be seen in the context of all political parties working to support transition and the dismantling of paramilitary structures and influence. Condemnations of criminality, though understandable, do nothing to help leverage a new dynamic of recognisable change to the benefit of Northern Ireland as a whole. Viewing loyalist paramilitarism in isolation from the social sphere in which it operates more serves the interests of those who refuse to engage or act on the need for change (and we include other dissident groups in this). Obviously, distinctions in terms of responsibility inside and outside organisations are important but the efforts of both simultaneously are necessary to support change. We therefore recommend the above as a starting point to help initiate a serious and discernible process of development that will lead to the end of loyalist paramilitary organisations and help remove the lingering influence of criminality and coercion that blights the lives of those who live in communities where such organisations are at work.
Chris Hudson, John Kyle and Trevor Ringland
